SYMPOSIUM: THE F UTURE OF R EPRODUCTIVE R IGHTS

PERILOUS PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES:
FROM POSSES AND CITIZEN’S ARREST TO TEXAS
HEARTBEAT STATUTES
Jennifer A. Brobst *
“Pandora’s Box has already been opened a bit, and time will tell.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
The utility of state private enforcement statutes restricting abortion
in Texas and other states is worthy of close scrutiny. The legality of
abortion in the United States has drawn vituperative attention to the role
of the courts, counsel, and private citizens in enforcing legal rights
generally, as well as the power of states to determine critical moral
questions not expressly addressed by the United States Constitution.
With respect to the latter, the Supreme Court deferred to state power
in 2022 in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, overturning
the landmark Roe v. Wade 2 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey 3 decisions. 4
As to the former concern related to the role of enforcement of abortion
restrictions, that issue was remanded back to the state courts by the United
States Supreme Court in Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 5 where it has
taken some unusual turns. In Jackson, the Texas Heartbeat Act bans an
Assistant Professor, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law, University of Memphis. The author extends
her thanks to the Center for Constitutional Law at the University of Akron and to the participants of
the Center’s October 28, 2022 Symposium on the Future of Reproductive Rights.
1. Order Declaring Certain Civil Procedures Unconstitutional and Issuing Declaratory
Judgment, Van Stean v. Texas Right to Life, No. D-1-GN-21-004179 (Dec. 9, 2021) (Peeples, J.).
2. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
4. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 2228(2022).
5. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021). An early similar
strategy in Texas involved a city ordinance permitting private enforcement of an abortion restriction,
declaring the City of Lubbock to be a “sanctuary city for the unborn.” Planned Parenthood of Greater
Texas Surgical Health Services v. City of Lubbock, Texas, 542 F. Supp. 3d 465 (N.D. Tex. 2021).
*
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abortion after detection of a fetal heartbeat, but also relies exclusively on
private enforcement through civil claims against medical providers and
those who aid and abet them. 6 Specifically, the Act provides for injunctive
relief, a minimum of $10,000 in statutory damages, and attorney’s fees,
when the plaintiff citizen files a claim for the following acts:
Except as provided by Section 171.205, a physician may not knowingly
perform or induce an abortion on a pregnant woman if the physician
detected a fetal heartbeat for the unborn child as required by Section
171.203 or failed to perform a test to detect a fetal heartbeat. 7

The stated rationale for the law is, in part, that “Texas has compelling
interests from the outset of a woman’s pregnancy in protecting the health
of the woman and the life of the unborn child.” 8
After Dobbs was decided and states, like Texas, subsequently
criminalized abortion, 9 some might have considered state reliance on civil
private enforcement statutes to be a non-issue. Why does it matter if a
physician could be sued, if they could be imprisoned for the same act?
However, this civil approach remains very much in place, and could
remain as a zombie or trigger law 10 even if the courts ultimately find that
the statutes fail for lack of standing.
The Texas private enforcement law had immediate impact because it
seeks to ensure a lack of federal constitutional oversight of a state law
which severely curtails the longstanding rights of women to terminate

6. See TEX. HEALTH & S AFETY C ODE ANN. §§ 171.204(a), 171.207(a), 171.208(a)(2), (3) (eff.
Sept. 1, 2021). See also SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Justice Collective v. Governor of
Georgia, 40 F.4th 1320 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Dobbs in finding a legitimate state interest in
enacting a fetal heartbeat abortion ban with regard to “respect for and preservation of prenatal life at
all stages of development”); Memphis Ctr. for Reproductive Health v. Slatery, No. 3:20-cv-00501,
2020 WL 4274198 (M.D. Tenn. 2020), vacated and remanded by 2022 WL 2570275 (6th Cir. 2022)
(vacating the district court’s granting of a preliminary injunction against criminal sanctions for a
violation of the Tennessee fetal heartbeat ban on abortion in light of Dobbs).
7. TEX. HEALTH & S AFETY C ODE ANN. § 171.204(a) (eff. Sept. 1, 2021).
8. Id. at § 171.202(3).
9. E.g., id. at § 171.065 (eff. Dec. 2, 2021) (felony criminal offense and administrative
sanctions for drug-induced termination of pregnancy); cf. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc.
v. Reynolds ex. rel. State, 975 N.W.2d 710 (Iowa 2022) (applying an Iowa statute that sanctions a
physician’s license for performing an abortion, but does not impose civil or criminal liability).
10. See Rose Wagner, It’s Not Halloween: Post-Roe America Could See Rise of “Zombie”
Abortion Bans, C OURTHOUSE NEWS S ERVICE (May 6, 2022), https://www.courthousenews.com/itsnot-halloween-post-roe-america-could-see-rise-of-zombie-abortion-b ans (discussing “zombie laws”
in the abortion context, where state laws deemed unconstitutional remained in statute, only to revive
when the Supreme Court changed its position on the constitutionality of the issue). E.g., Planned
Parenthood Great Northwest v. State, 2022 WL 3335696 (Idaho 2022); EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr.,
PSC v. Cameron, 2022 WL 3641196 (Ky. 2022).
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their pregnancy by wholly excluding state action. 11 The Supreme Court of
Texas on remand also held that the statute precludes criminal sanctions
and professional discipline against the providers for violations of the
Act. 12 An odd state of affairs, for in order to avoid protection of civil rights
under the federal constitution, the State of Texas had to trust its citizenry
to behave like good citizens when enforcing state law.
The oral argument before the United States Supreme Court
in Jackson began: “To allow Texas’s scheme to stand would provide a
roadmap for other states to abrogate any decision of this Court with which
they disagree.” 13 That is not the only problem. Even if private
enforcement has always had lawful applications, it is imperative that it be
authorized very selectively and only when the public with authority to
enforce the law is in relative agreement. Here, Texas chose private
enforcement for one of the most controversial legal issues in American
history.
Over a dozen other state legislatures have put forth similar bills that
would support private enforcement of abortion restrictions, although not
all have been successful. 14 The Texas strategy has also been replicated for
other issues, such as California legislation to authorize private lawsuits by
anyone, other than the government, against anyone who manufactures
assault weapons or unserialized ghost guns. 15 This California firearms
legislation expressly states that its provisions will become inoperative

11. See Lauren Moxley Beatty, The Resurrection of State Nullification–and the Degradation of
Constitutional Rights: SB8 and the Blueprint for State Copycat Laws, 111 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 18
(2022); Simona Grossi, Roe v. Wade Under Attack: Choosing Procedural Doctrines Over
Fundamental Constitutional Rights, 13 C ONLAW NOW 39 (2022).
12. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 642 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. 2022).
13. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021)
(No. 21-463) (Marc A. Hearron, Attorney for the Petitioner).
14. See Susan Rinkunas, We’re Tracking All the Texas-Style Abortion Bills, JEZEBEL (Jan. 4,
2022),
https://jezebel.com/were-tracking-all-the-texas-style-abo rtion-bills-1848300080.
The
Oklahoma Legislature passed a law mirroring the Texas Heartbeat Act and its private enforcement
provisions, signed by the Governor on May 25. 2022 (HB 4327), to be codified under 63 OKLA. S TAT.
§ 1-745.34.
15. Cal. S.B. 1327 (approved by the Governor, July 22, 2022) (adding B US. & P ROF. C ODE §
22949.65(a), which states “Any person, other than an officer or employee of a state or local
governmental entity in this state, may bring a civil action against any person who does any of the
following: [violates or aids and abets the violation of section 22949.62].”). See Tom Hals, Explainer:
Can U.S. Gunmakers be Liable for Mass Shootings?, R EUTERS (May 26, 2022),
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/can-us-gunmakers-be-liable-mass-shooting-2022-05-25/
(“Th e
bill, which is supported by Governor Gavin Newsom, is styled on a Texas anti-abortion ‘vigilante’
law that is meant to skirt conflicting federal law.”).
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should the Texas Heartbeat Act be held unconstitutional by the United
States Supreme Court or the Texas Supreme Court. 16
II. PRIVATE E NFORCEMENT SINCE THE WILD WEST
Although it did not issue an injunction, the district court in San
Antonio held the enforcement provision of the Texas Heartbeat Act
unconstitutional under the open courts and separation of powers
provisions of the Texas Constitution and under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 17 Aside from its procedural and
constitutional infirmities, placing private enforcement in historical
context aids in understanding when it may be a sustainable strategy. First,
the strategy of involving the populace in the enforcement of legislative
mandates has a long history in the United States. Also, self-help is a
necessity where law enforcement is not equipped to prevent and respond
to every call for assistance. 18 Citizen’s arrest, posse comitatus, and
mandatory reporting of misconduct by citizens, including professional
misconduct, all involve private action for the common good in state and
local jurisdictions. What they also share is an undercurrent of restraint,
where both the public and the government understand that private
enforcement only has social utility under narrow circumstances.
A.

The Purpose and Scope of the Citizen’s Arrest

The need for restraint in the scope of citizen’s arrest is demonstrated
by both early and modern case law. Not surprisingly, citizen’s arrest has
been the subject of overzealous application by members of the public, who
were themselves charged with trespass, assault, and battery. 19 Without
enough guidance or accountability, private citizens have a tendency
toward excess, especially when they feel they are on a mission.

16. Cal. S.B. 1327 (approved by the Governor, July 22, 2022) (C AL. B US. & P ROF. C ODE
§22949.71).
17. See Van Stean Order, supra note 1.
18. See, e.g., Howell v. City of New York, 2022 WL 17096862 (N.Y. 2022) (granting motion
of city and officer to dismiss for failure to state a claim based on sovereign immunity, with respect to
a plaintiff victim of crime who obtained multiple protective orders, unsuccessfully sought help from
law enforcement, and was ultimately thrown out of a third floor window by her ex-boyfriend).
19. See Chad Flanders et al., The Puzzling Persistence of Citizen’s Arrest Laws and the Need
to Revisit Them, 64 HOW . L.J. 161 (2020); Ira P. Robbins, Vilifying the Vigilante: A Narrowed Scope
of Citizen’s Arrest, 25 C ORNELL J.L. & P UB. P OL’Y 557 (2016) (providing a historical review of the
common law right to citizen’s arrest and extending it to modern citizen patrol groups such as the
Guardian Angels in New York).
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As a case in point, nineteenth-century case law in Illinois reflecting
inappropriate motives for citizen’s arrest was met with varied responses
from the courts, holding a citizen’s arrest unlawful for the offense of
“association with persons of bad character,” 20 but lawful when confining
a man in a “rough place” without food or contact because he was a “night
walker” and could not give a “good account” of himself. 21 Modern case
law indicates that ill-advised attempts at citizen’s arrest have resulted in
false imprisonment and negligent infliction of emotional distress tort
claims. 22 In 2022, the California Court of Appeal upheld defendants’
motions for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s claim for
injuries when he allegedly tried to make a citizen’s arrest at a Costco gas
station, which erupted into a fist fight and physical intervention by the gas
station attendant. 23
The Restatement (Third) of Torts asserts that private actors are
privileged to use force to arrest another person for acts constituting
felonies and when they witness the person committing a breach of the
peace, 24 with commentary that the privilege is “a limited, backstop
mechanism to facilitate enforcement of the law.” 25 Nevertheless, states
vary in circumscribing the scope of citizen’s arrest. Washington has not
codified citizen’s arrest, but upholds its use under the common law. 26
Virginia statutory law permits a citizen’s arrest for acts constituting
felonies, but also permits under common law such arrests for breaches of
the peace or a violation of “public decorum.” 27 The Texas Criminal Code
provides that “[a] peace officer or any other person, may, without a
warrant, arrest an offender when the offense is committed in his presence
or within his view, if the offense is one classed as a felony or as an offense
against the public peace.” 28 Mere detention would not constitute arrest
under the meaning of the Texas statute. 29 Illinois, however, does not
20. Dodds v. Board, 43 Ill. 95 (1867).
21. Miles v. Weston, 60 Ill. 361, 366 (1871).
22. E.g., Agindotan v. Wells Fargo & Co., 2021 WL 345525 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) (holding that
the coercive elements of false arrest for detention at a bank were not met, but that the false accusation
of presenting a counterfeit check based on his Nigerian descent, if true, “reflect deeply troubling
conduct”).
23. Valdez v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2022 WL 170703858 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022).
24. R ESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 35 (Oct. 2022).
25. Id. at § 35 cmt. B.
26. See State v. Gonzalez, 604 P.2d 168 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a private citizen,
here a store owner and employee, may perform a citizen’s arrest when they have observed a person
shoplifting).
27. Hudson v. Comm., 585 S.E.2d 583 (Va. 2003).
28. TEX. C RIM. C ODE ANN. § 14.01(a) (West 2022) (Offense Within View) (emphasis added).
29. See Melendez v. State, 467 S.W.3d 586 (Tex. App. 2015).
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impose contemporaneity as a restriction, where its statute provides: “Any
person may arrest another when he has reasonable grounds to believe that
an offense other than an ordinance violation is being committed.”30
Having probable cause to effect a citizen’s arrest may also constitute a
defense to criminal conduct, which is a question for the jury, 31 but only if
the conduct of the person “arrested” involved exigent circumstances. 32
Where this state variation comes together is that authority to act is
given, but motive is unquestioned. This would be true of private
enforcement of the Texas Heartbeat Act. The motives of those engaged in
citizen’s arrests remain deeply concerning at times, such as the racist
motives of the white defendants convicted in 2022 in Georgia of the
murder of Ahmaud Arbery, a black man running in their neighborhood,
whom they claimed they suspected to be a burglar. 33 Georgia became the
first state to repeal its citizen’s arrest statute, 34 with some of the early
history of citizen’s arrest in the United States linked to the brutal history
of slavery. 35 In other cases, the right of the public to detain a person for
traffic violations, for example, continues to be upheld by the courts. 36 But
the courts still recognize the risks, where the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts refused to extend the power of a citizen’s arrest to acts such
as misdemeanor driving while intoxicated, stating that such an extension
could encourage “vigilantism and anarchistic actions.” 37 As stated by the
dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals of New York in 2020:
Our recent national history is fraught with difficulties in race relations,
amidst a cultural context in which there is a sharp division over the use
30. 726 ILL. C OMP. S TAT. 5/107-3 (West 2022) (Arrest by Private Person).
31. City of Helena v. Parsons, 436 P. 3d 710 (Mont. 2019) (asserting the defense of an
attempted citizen’s arrest to a charge of reckless driving, when, after observing law enforcement chas e
a motorcycle and blocking the road to assist, resulting in the motorcyclist crashing and becoming
injured).
32. State v. Lazaryan, 2009 WL 3426413 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that the trial court
properly instructed the jury that citizen’s arrest was not a valid defense for trespassing and disorderly
conduct charges related to gaining access to government data unlawfully).
33. Father and Son Sentenced to Life for a Hate Crime in Ahmaud Arbery’s Death, NPR (Aug.
8, 2022),
https://www.npr.org/2022/08/08/1116261783/mcmichael-bryan-sentencing-ahmau darbery#:~:text=%E2%80%94%20The%20white%20father%20and%20son,committing%20a%20fed
eral%20hate%20crime.
34. See Alexandra Beato & Melissa Davies, HB 479: Repeal of Georgia’s Citizen’s Arrest Law,
38 GA. S T. U. L. R EV. 25 (2021); see also Bacon v. State, 820 S.E.2d 503 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (holding
that an off-duty police officer acting outside of his jurisdiction could not rely on his official authority,
but may effect a citizen’s arrest).
35. See Roger M. Stevens, A Legacy of Slavery: The Citizen’s Arrest Laws of Georgia and
South Carolina, 72 S.C. L. R EV. 105 (2021).
36. E.g., People v. Williams, 74 N.E. 3d 58 (Ill. App. 2017).
37. Comm. v. Grise, 496 N.Ed.2d 162 (Mass. 1986).
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of guns. This would surely justify caution in this area [of citizen’s
arrest], rather than an expansion. Recent years have seen a spate of
incidents in which self-proclaimed law enforcement officials, such as
neighborhood watch group or homeowners association members, and
similar vigilantes have engaged in aggressive conduct, often with tragic
consequences. . . . The expansion of citizen’s arrest jurisprudence to
amplify the authority of law enforcement officials who are not police or
peace officers is an egregious mistake. 38

Thus, private enforcement in the form of citizen’s arrest has not been
a preferred method of the government or the public for some time and for
good reason. Although systemic abuses in enforcement of the criminal
justice system have been subject to calls for reform, calling on the public
to assist and intervene is an approach fraught with risk. Most members of
the public are untrained and biased in their investigation practices, and are
not constrained by licensure or employment discipline. 39
B.

The Purpose and Scope of the Posse

With respect to the posse, its lawful use has been more limited
historically than citizen’s arrest laws. A posse or posse comitatus is
generally defined as a “[g]roup of people acting under authority of police
or sheriff and engaged in searching for a criminal or in making an
arrest.” 40 The right of law enforcement to enlist members of the public to
assist them in their investigations and in making an arrest is derived from
the common law and subsequently enacted into state statute. The practice
has been upheld against Thirteenth Amendment challenges of involuntary
servitude as a special circumstance justified by public need and civic
duty. 41 In early English common law, when law enforcement was less
developed during the Medieval era, 42 the sheriff had the right to call upon
male members of the general public to prevent riots and to arrest suspects,
a practice widely adopted by American states. 43
In Arkansas, for example, it is a criminal offense to refuse to assist
law enforcement, upheld against constitutional challenge, where, a police
38. People v. Page, 149 N.E.3d 905, 916 (N.Y. 2020) (Fahey, J., dissenting).
39. But see Romo v. State, 577 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (out-of-jurisdiction officer
made lawful citizen’s arrest); see also Turner v. State, 901 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. App. 1995) (private
security guard not a peace officer but authorized to make a citizen’s arrest).
40. B LACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
41. Boyle v. City of Liberty, Mo., 833 F. Supp. 1436, 1445 (1993).
42. R ESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 35, Rep. note a. (Oct. 2022) (addressing the origins of
the “hue and cry” laws).
43. Williams v. State, 490 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Ark. 1973).
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officer commanded two members of the public who happened to be
walking by to watch the back of a house to see if a shoplifting suspect
would emerge. 44 The members of the public refused vehemently and were
arrested for doing so when they “profanely stated that they would not
assist a police officer at any time or place, and would not help him if he
were lying in the street dying.” 45 Enlistment also poses risks to members
of the public, as shown in Missouri where the public was asked to park
their cars in the middle of the highway to create a road block to stop a
high-speed car chase, resulting in substantial property damage and the
death of a participating civilian member of the posse, as well as civil
litigation against the municipalities and State Highway Patrol. 46
This common law practice authorizing law enforcement to create a
posse has understandably become less favorable over time and less
necessary as law enforcement departments became fully and regularly
staffed. 47 The continued reticence of the public to assist law enforcement
is clear. For example, red flag gun statutes that involve public reporting
of persons of concern who possess firearms are decried by some as
unconstitutional violations of due process and sanctioning pre-crime. 48
As a narrower application, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 was
enacted during Reconstruction after the Civil War to address the use of
military personnel in the South to enforce law and to hold Federal troops
accountable. 49 Today it continues to limit military involvement in local
law enforcement activities:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized
by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the
Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Air Force, or the Space Force as
a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 50

At the federal level, military personnel who cooperate with state law
enforcement in providing evidence of criminal activity, such as drug
trafficking and possession, will not necessarily violate the Posse
44. Id. (applying ARK. C ODE ANN.§ 42-204 (1964)).
45. Id. at 119.
46. Boyle v. City of Liberty, Mo., 833 F. Supp. 1436 (1993).
47. Williams, 490 S.W.2d at 121.
48. See Amber Phillips, What are Red-flag Laws?, WASH. P OST (June 14, 2022),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/06/14/what-is-a-red-flag-law/.
49. People v. Hayes, 494 N.E.2d 1238 (Ill. App. 1986) (addressing 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1982)).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (last amended by Pub. L. 117-81, 135 Stat. 1904, Dec. 27, 2021). A
member of the State National Guard is considered a “hybrid” member of the National Armed Forces
and will not be subject to the Posse Comitatus Act until called to national duty. See Doggett v. State,
791 So.2d 1043, 1046 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).
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Comitatus Act if they are deemed to be cooperating with an investigation
without engaging in military activity. 51 If the military investigators are
working directly for the Department of Defense pursuant to federal
investigation, then there is no violation of the Act. 52 This form of posse
does not involve the same risks as private enforcement by members of the
general public, where the Posse Comitatus Act addresses the risk of “the
potential danger of military permeation of civilian law enforcement”53 as
a way to undercut democratic institutions, rather than arbitrary
enforcement of the law by untrained members of the public.
C.

Modern Mandatory Reporting Laws

In contrast, modern state mandatory reporting laws, such as child
abuse and neglect reports by the public or the professional reporting of
impaired colleagues, have been more well received. They often seek to
prevent harm and enable early support on matters generally agreed upon
by the public to be worthy of concern. These laws are justified, in part,
because they rely on necessity, where state investigators have difficulty
detecting potential harm. Heartbeat Act proponents would likely argue
that private enforcement is also necessary to protect life from lethal
actions conducted in secrecy. However, there are significant differences.
Mandatory child abuse reporting laws by members of the public are
made to an official body of experts with the power to screen out those
reports that are frivolous or unsubstantiated. Unlike Heartbeat Act claims,
reports of abuse and neglect are not made for personal profit in the form
of statutory damages. In addition, professional reporting and selfregulation relies on experience, training and expertise within the
professional membership, which inherently informs and constrains those
reporting legal, medical, and other professionals to disciplinary boards.
For example, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct state that “[a]
lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the
rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects,
shall inform the appropriate professional authority.” 54 Attorneys are
guided by and trained to understand the language and import of the rules,
51. Hayes, 494 N.E.2d. at 1240 (holding that Naval investigators who turned over evidence of
drug activity to the Chicago Police did not violate the Posse Comitatus Act).
52. U.S. v. Hartley, 486 F. Supp. 1348, 1357 (M.D. Fla. 1980).
53. Id.
54. MODEL R ULES OF P ROF’L C ONDUCT r. 8.3(a) (AM. B AR ASS’N 2020). See also cmt. [3] to
Rule 8.3, which provides that “[a] report should be made to the bar disciplinary agency unless some
other agency, such as a peer review agency is more appropriate in the circumstances.”
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as well as their interpretation in ethics opinions, and the scope and
preamble of the rules and their official comments. While members of the
public may file a grievance against an attorney with the same disciplinary
body, they are not mandated to do so, and they will not be financially
compensated. Should they file a malpractice claim for damages, they
would have clear standing as the injured client.
Physicians have a similar duty to report impaired colleagues under
the American Medical Association (AMA) Code of Medical Ethics as a
form of self-regulation. The purpose of the duty is to protect patient
interests and assist their professional colleagues in receiving needed
care. 55 However, the AMA opposes mandatory reporting of whole classes
of patients or diagnoses absent a compelling public health benefit for
reporting. 56 Even among professionals who may agree that particular
actions are concerning, mandatory private enforcement remains
unsettling. For example, the California ballot initiative which mandated
that physicians report patients’ undocumented status was held unlawful
by the courts in the 1990s. 57 The Texas Heartbeat Act makes no such
presumptions of discomfort, encouraging members of the public to sue
medical professionals whom they may never have met.
III. PRIVATE E NFORCEMENT ON CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES: BAD ACTORS
AND BAD POLICY
The Texas Heartbeat Act specifically permits and encourages
members of the general public in any state to sue Texas medical
professionals and those who aid and abet them to unlawfully perform an
abortion. 58 According to the statute, such members of the public have
standing to sue, although Texas courts have already found otherwise,
identifying the fatal procedural flaw that there is no injury in fact to the
55. C ODE OF MED. ETHICS Op. 9.3.2.
56. See Danielle Hahn Chaet, AMA Policies and AMA Code of Medical Ethics’ Opinions
Related to Responding to Violence, 20 AMA J. ETHICS 44 (Jan. 2018), https://journalofethics.amaassn.org/article/ama-policies-and-ama-code-medical-ethics -opinions-relat ed-respondingviolence/201801#:~:text=The%20opinion%20further%20states%20that,all%2050%20states%20%5B8%5D.
57. C AL. P ROP. 187 (1994). League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp.
1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that federal immigration law preempts California from enacting state
law to regulate immigration, thus barring enforcement of California Proposition 187). See Susan
Coyle, Ethics Case Study: Providing Care to Undocumented Immigrants, THE HOSPITALIST 25, n. 12
(July/Aug. 2003), https://www.acponline.org/system/files/documents/running_practice/ethics/case_
studies/care_imm.pdf.
58. See generally Michael T. Morley, Constitutional Tolling and Preenforcement Challenges
to Private Rights of Action, 97 NOTRE DAME L. R EV. 1825 (2022); Richard D. Rosen, Deterring Previability Abortions in Texas Through Private Lawsuits, 54 TEX. TECH. L. R EV. 115 (2021).
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plaintiff. 59 In Jackson v. Whole Woman’s Health, lack of Article III
standing precluded a ruling on the substance of the claim, where the
individual plaintiff, a prominent anti-abortion advocate, admitted he had
no intention of filing a lawsuit despite his role in helping to create the state
legislation. 60 The Court, however, in dicta did acknowledge the possibility
of a challenge based on standing:
This is not to say that the petitioners, or other abortion providers, lack
potentially triable state-law claims that S. B. 8 improperly delegates
state law enforcement authority. Nor do we determine whether any
particular S. B. 8 plaintiff possesses standing to sue under state
justiciability doctrines. We note only that such arguments do not justify
federal courts abandoning traditional limits on their equitable authority
and our precedents enforcing them.61

The Texas state legislature expressly sought to restrict the medical
profession’s discretionary role in providing health services to the public,
but it also attached the specter of personal liability for fees to attorneys
who take on legal representation that challenges the law, allowing claims
up to three years after the case is closed. 62 The approach is to engender
fear among licensed professionals of the general public to achieve a
particular end, which is starkly different from most other private
enforcement laws. In the Texas enforcement law, the public includes
litigants from any state, 63 where the first three cases filed in Texas against
an abortion provider who admitted he had violated the Act were from
Arkansas, Illinois, and Texas, with no connection to the doctor or patient.
The only persons prohibited from filing a complaint under the statute are
government officials and men who caused the pregnancy through sexual
violence: 64
Any person, other than an officer or employee of a state or local
governmental entity in this state, may bring a civil action against any
person who:
1. Performs or induces an abortion in violation of this subchapter;

59. Standing has also been denied in challenges to a legal right to abortion by “unborn
plaintiffs.” E.g., Benson v. McKee, 273 A.3d 121 (R.I. 2022).
60. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. at 537. See also Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 31 F.4th 1004 (5th
Cir. 2022) (dismissing challenges to the private enforcement provisions).
61. Id. at 535 n.2.
62. TEX. C IV. P RAC. & R EM. C ODE ANN. § 30.022 (West 2022) (Award of Attorney’s Fees in
Actions Challenging Abortion Laws).
63. TEX. HEALTH & S AFETY C ODE ANN. § 171.208(a) (West 2022) (eff. Sept. 1, 2021).
64. Id. at § 171.208(j) (West 2022) (eff. Sept. 1, 2021).
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2. Knowingly engages in conduct that aids or abets the
performance or inducement of an abortion, including paying
for or reimbursing the costs of an abortion through insurance
or otherwise, if the abortion is performed or induced in
violation of this subchapter, regardless of whether the persons
knew or should have known that the abortion would be
performed or induced in violation of this subchapter; or
3. Intends to engage in the conduct described by Subdivision (1)
or (2). 65

Unlike some of the other forms of private enforcement discussed
above, such as professional mandatory reporting, under the Texas
Heartbeat Act, plaintiffs as members of the general public have no
requisite expertise or training in the medical field, or understanding of the
medical needs or interests of the patient receiving care. The court
receiving the filing of the complaint is the general governing body
screening its validity, rather than a specialized licensing body or
government agency. While civil private enforcement actions under the
Heartbeat Act are not mandatory and do not involve coercion by the
government or use of force, 66 they offer a financial reward to the
successful plaintiff and involve no assessment for the potential for
improper motive. As shown by the long history of litigation surrounding
citizen’s arrest laws, the motives of a member of the public may often be
questionable when authorized to enforce the law and exert its power. 67
Lawful abortions have now ceased in the State of Texas. 68 The Texas
Heartbeat Act currently retains its private enforcement provision, and
litigation to overturn it is wending its way through state and federal courts.
In effect, now that the practice of medical abortion is a felony crime, those
plaintiffs in the general public potentially seeking monetary gain through

65. Id. at § 171.208(a) (emphasis added).
66. See generally Jacob D. Charles & Darrell A.H. Miller, Violence and Nondelegation, 135
HARV. L. R EV. F. 463 (2022).
67. Compare Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Response, Taking Aim at Pointing Guns? Start with
Citizen’s Arrest, Not Stand Your Ground, 100 TEX. L. R EV. ONLINE ED. (Sept. 2021),
https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Ferzan.Publication.pdf (arguing that the
combination of stand-your-ground laws expanding the right to use lethal self-defense, combined with
citizen’s arrest, creates public policy concerns).
68. Erin Douglas & Eleanor Klibanoff, Abortions in Texas Have Stopped After Attorney
General Ken Paxton said Pre-Roe Bans Could be in Effect, Clinics Say, TEX. TRIB. (June 24, 2022),
https://www.texastribune.org/2022/06/24/texas-clinics-abortions-whole-womanshealth/#:~:text=Abortions%20in%20Texas%20have%20ceased,and%20Planned%20Parenthood%2
0Texas%20said.
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the Act could also set in motion official criminal arrests and prosecution.69
The Texas Heartbeat Act has revealed that private enforcement under state
law is a dangerous but effective means of curtailing the conduct of
individuals, even highly skilled, professionally licensed individuals
without federal constitutional protection.
Whether private enforcement is an apt approach for certain types of
harms deserves renewed discussion, particularly if a state legislature as a
representative body has given sole enforcement power to the public. The
argument here is not that private enforcement should be discouraged; it is
that private enforcement is a valuable tool for society for certain, narrow,
uncontroversial purposes. Admittedly, sole reliance on government
enforcement of the law may be ill-advised and could lead to public apathy
toward helping others, 70 or even to an imbalance of power between a
government and its citizens. 71 Nevertheless, clearly history would suggest
that private enforcement is an unwise strategy to enforce the law when
public opinion is deeply divided, as it is in the American legal abortion
debate.

69. See Eleanor Klibanoff, Texans Who Perform Abortions Now Face Up to Life in Prison,
$100,000 Fine, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 25, 2022), https://www.texastribune.org/2022/08/25/texas-triggerlaw-abortion.
70. M. C HERIF B ASSIOUNI , C ITIZEN’S ARREST: THE LAW OF ARREST, S EARCH, AND S EIZURE
FOR P RIVATE C ITIZENS AND P RIVATE P OLICE 76-77 (1977).
71. See Luke P. Norris, The Promise and Perils of Private Enforcement, 108 VA. L. R EV. 1483,
1545 (2022).

